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deed, the language of the preamble would seem to indicate a means
whereby those disbursements permitted under CCA 1908 can be restricted, not supplemented, if a specific law so provides. Rather, any
expansion of the permissible disbursements should utilize as its sole
basis the "omnibus" provisions of CCA 1908(f).183 Caution, however,
should be utilized when interpreting this subsection. Prior to Santiago,
it had not been construed, 8 4 and earlier and more restrictive cases 18 5
were decided under previous statutes and theories. Thus, although
substantial portions of the earlier laws were retained, 186 the precedental
value of cases decided under the CPA as an aid in construing CCA
1908(f is questionable in view of the liberal construction demanded
of the CPLR provisions which this CCA subsection incorporates.
A second alternative suggested by the Santiago rationale would be
to view CCA 1908(f) as adopting CPLR 8301(a)(12), 18 7 thereby avoiding the $250 limitation contained in CPLR 8301(a)(9). This approach
allows an attorney to "exercise his ingenuity in bringing items of cost
within [CPLR 8301(a)(12)'s] scope in order to shift the finanical burden
u8
of the lawsuit to his adversary."'
In short, the logical interaction of CPLR 8301(a) and CCA 1908(f
provide an attorney with the vehicle by which he can secure payment
of expenses justly incurred in the prosecution of his client's action.
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BCL 304(a): Court will not vacate default judgment where corporate
defendant had not received notice due to its own neglect.
An action against a corporation may be commenced by service of
process upon an officer, director, managing agent or cashier of the corporation,8 9 by service upon its registered agent, 19 0 or by service upon
the Secretary of State. 191 In the latter instance, service is completed
188 CCA 1908(f) permits the taxation of disbursements for all "reasonable and necessary expenses as are prescribed by law or taxable by express provision of law."
184 Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion at 1, Santiago v. Johnson, 61 Misc.
2d 746, 305 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1969).
185 See, e.g., Landstrom Realty Corp. v. Lamborn, 144 Misc. 701, 259 N.Y.S. 495 (App.
T. 2d Dep't 1932) (error to allow the cost of the minutes of an examination before trial

as a taxable disbursement).
186 See, e.g., FouaRTH REP. 326. Compare CPLR 8301(a) with CPA 1518.
187 CPLR 8301(a)(12) is another "omnibus clause," perhaps even broader than CCA
1908(t). It permits disbursements for "reasonable and necessary expenses as are taxable
according to the course and practice of the court, by express provision of law or by
order of the court." 8 W. K. & M. 8301.24, at 83-36.1.
188 8 W. K. & M.
8801.01, at 88-86.
189 CPLR 311(1).

190 N.Y. Bus. Corn'. L.w § 805 (McKinney 1968) [hereinafter BCL].
191 BCL 304(a). This section, as well as the two previously cited, is applicable to both
domestic and foreign corporations,
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when the Secretary of State is served, 192 as it is he who is charged with
19 3
the duty of forwarding the summons to the defendant corporation.
19
4
In Detelich v. Mayo's R & A Clothing, Inc., the plaintiff served
his summons and complaint upon the Secretary of State. However, because the corporation had failed to advise the latter of a change of
address, it never received the forwarded complaint. Nonetheless, the
court denied defendant's subsequent motion to vacate the default judgment obtained by the plaintiff. 195
In deciding motions to vacate a default judgment in instances
where a defendant corporation was without notice of the action, the
New York courts have been guided by a simple test: who is at fault,
the corporation or the Secretary of State?19 6 Consequently, in view of
the Detelich court's finding that the corporation, and not the Secretary
of State, was at fault, the result is in accord with prior cases and BCL
197
304(d).
The lesson for the practitioner is clear: courts will only require
the Secretary to mail the process to the designated address currently on
file with the department of state. It is therefore imperative that counsel
promptly notify the Secretary of each change of address of his corporate
clients.
192 BCL 306(b). Service upon the Secretary of State has been held to constitute
proper personal service upon the defendant corporation. See National Mfg. Co. v. Buffalo
Metal Container Corp., 204 Misc. 209, 126 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1953). Thus,
CPLR 317, which concerns judgments obtained where the service was other than personal, is not applicable if the Secretary has been properly served; rather, CPLR 5015
governs.
193 BCL 306(b).
19460 Misc. 2d 788, 304 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1969).
195 The court pointed out an attempted settlement by defendant's insurer. Although
not controlling, it is speculated that knowledge of the injury was accorded some weight
by the court. See Horn v. Interlectron Corp., 294 F.Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
196 Satisfactory proof, however, that a defendant has never received copies of
the .

.

. process from the Secretary of State's office -

impliedly through mistake

or inadvertance on the part of the latter- has been held a proper ground for
reopening of a default judgment ....
Montulli v. Sherlo Realty, Inc., 37 Misc. 2d 655, 656, 234 N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1962), afd, 18 App. Div.2d 1139, 239 N.Y.S.2d 864 (4th Dep't 1963). Compare Cascione v. Acme Equip. Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 49, 258 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1st Dep't
1965) and National Mfg. Corp. v. Buffalo Metal Container Corp., 204 Misc. 269, 126
N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1953) (judgments vacated) with Laurendi v. Cascade
Dev. Co., 5 Misc. 2d 688, 165 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Niagara County Ct.), af'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 852,
167 N.Y.S.2d 240 (4th Dep't 1957) and General Crane Serv., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner
Constr. Co., 27 Misc. 2d 403, 208 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1960).
197 BCL 304(d) provides that the designated address to which the Secretary shall
forward the process continues as such "until the filing of a certificate under this chapter
directing the mailing to a different post office address."

